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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the birth of the modern environmental movement in
1970, federal law has encouraged broad public participation in both
the development and enforcement of environmental policy.' The
development of pollution standards, for example, has been conducted
primarily at the agency level with extensive public comment and
review. 2 Likewise, private citizens have been encouraged, both by
Congress and the courts, to participate in the enforcement of those
standards once they have been promulgated.3 In both contexts,
administrative review has been readily available, and access to the
courts limited only by such constitutional and prudential consider-
ations as standing and ripeness.4
With the establishment of the Emergency Salvage Timber Sale
Program5 (Salvage Tmber Rider or Rider) on July 27, 1995, the
federal government departed from this long-standing practice. The
Rider instituted a program for the expedited sale and removal of trees
"imminently susceptible to fire or insect attack,"6 including healthy
trees "associated" with susceptible trees. 7 The Rider does not apply
to private land, but does govern millions of acres of national forest,8
1. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 716 (1992); see also
Chisman Hanes, Citizen Participation and Its Impact Upon Prompt and Responsible
Administrative Action, 24 Sw. L.J. 731, 732 (1970) (recognizing, as early as 1970, the
growing insistence upon citizen participation concerning controversial issues like
environmental regulation).
2. The Clean Water Act, for example, requires the Environmental Protection Agency
to develop and promulgate water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1994). Prior to
codification in the Code of Federal Regulations, the standards are published in the Federal
Register, allowing for public comment and review. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 400-424 (1995)
(containing effluent standards promulgated under the Clean Water Act).
3. See infra part IV.B.2.a.
4. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 716-17.
5. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance, for
Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy That Occurred
at Oklahoma City, and Rescissions Act, Pub. L. No. 104-19, § 2001, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(109 Stat.) 194, 240-54 [hereinafter Salvage Timber Rider].
6. Id. § 2001(a)(3).
7. Id.
8. The Rider applies to lands under the jurisdiction of the National Forest Service
and the Bureau of Land Management. Id. § 2001(a)(4). The National Forest System alone
comprises 191 million acres. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW § 9.2(A)(2) (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993). The Rider exempts lands
included in the National Wilderness Preservation System, Salvage Timber Rider, supra
note 5, § 2001(g)(2)(A), and lands on which timber harvesting for any purpose is
prohibited by statute, id. § 2001(g)(2)(D).
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including old-growth stands in the Pacific Northwest.9 Although it
expires on December 31, 1996,1" salvaging conducted after this
deadline will continue to be governed by the Rider as long as the
sales contract was consummated prior to the December deadline."
Furthermore, a retroactive provision applies to any past sales that
were enjoined for failing to comply with the federal environmental
laws applicable at that time.12 In those cases, as long as the sale
conforms to the provisions of the Rider, the Forest Service (Service)
may simply ignore the outstanding court orders.13 Despite the label
as an "emergency" or temporary provision, therefore, the Rider may
have a tremendous long-term impact on the nation's forests.
The objective of this Comment is not to debate the substantive
merits of timber salvage, an issue best left to biologists and forestry
personnel. Instead, the goal is to criticize the provisions of the Rider
inhibiting public participation in the agency implementation of this
vague and highly discretionary statute. In this respect, the Rider
represents a marked departure from existing environmental policy.
Part II of this Comment describes, in general terms, how actions
by unelected agency officials are legitimized through direct public
involvement, and touches on the practical benefits that result from
public participation in the administrative process. Part III back-
grounds the role of salvage timber operations in American forestry,
and describes how Congress reacted to the salvage timber issue by
accelerating the Rider through the legislative process with little
opportunity for either legislative or public debate. Part IV examines,
in detail, those provisions of the Rider which impact public involve-
ment in the salvage timber process, including the provision rendering
all existing federal environmental laws inapplicable to salvage timber
sales, and the provisions inhibiting citizens from seeking administra-
tive or judicial review. Part V assesses the constitutionality of the
Rider in light of the Supreme Court's legislative non-delegation and
procedural due process doctrines, both of which directly relate to the
democratic themes discussed in Part II. Finally, Part VI contemplates
that the procedural restrictions in the Rider may not reflect a trend
9. James Gerstenzang, Clinton Backs Repeal of Logging Provision, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
25, 1996, at A16.
10. Salvage Timber Rider, supra note 5, § 2001(j).
11. Id.
12. Id. § 2001(c)(9).
13. Id.
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toward restrictions on public participation, but rather are merely an
expedient and inappropriate mechanism for Congress to indirectly
undermine the substance of existing salvage timber law.
By facilitating and expediting timber sales, the Rider is inherently
favorable to timber industry interests. This does not necessitate the
conclusion, however, that prohibitions on public participation will
always hinder environmental causes. Both industry and environmen-
tal groups are shut out of the deliberative process by the Rider's
procedural restrictions. The same restrictions, if included.in future,
protection-oriented legislation, would similarly curb any business or
industry efforts to help review or challenge implementation.
The Comment concludes that the Salvage Timber Rider is a
dangerous procedural precedent. The extraordinary discretion dele-
gated to the agencies is both unnecessary and nondemocratic. The
policies which encourage public participation are as valid today as
they were two decades ago, and Congress should not initiate a trend
toward reduced public participation in the administrative process.
Alternatively, if the Rider was simply intended to effectuate a
congressional desire to alter the substantive law of timber salvage, it
may represent an even more troubling precedent. Congress should
not undermine the will of the people by indirectly attacking the
substance of popular environmental laws via manipulations of the
procedural provisions for public participation.
In contrast to the Salvage Timber Rider, any future restrictions
on public participation in environmental legislation should be
thoroughly debated by both Congress and the public, and should
minimize impacts on the people's ability to voice their concerns at the
administrative and judicial levels.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATION IN A DEMOCRACY
A fundamental tenet of our democratic government is that power
ultimately resides with the people. 4 Accordingly, when elected
officials fail to represent their constituency, they may be voted out of
office. Today, however, most environmental management is at the
administrative level, with policy decisions being developed and
enforced by unelected agency officials, both via formal regulation and
informal decision making. Although Congress defines major policy
14. Adam Babich, Citizen Suits: The Teeth in Public Participation, 25 ENVTL. L. REP.
10141, 10142 (1995).
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objectives, the implementation of those policies is delegated to
administrative officials who, in contrast to elected representatives, are
not directly answerable to the voters.
The necessity of legislative delegation, however, is indisputable.
Without it, Congress would be overwhelmed by technical detail. The
key to ensuring the democratic legitimacy of unelected officials,
therefore, is to provide the people-particularly those directly affected
by the agency's exercise of power-a voice in the administrative
process. 5  Federal agencies are, after all, "deemed to be arms of
Congress to whom petitions may be addressed,"16 making restrictions
on public involvement contrary to the fundamental freedom of the
people to petition the government for redress. 7
Historically, this principle has been embraced by all branches of
the federal government. Congress has facilitated challenges to
unelected administrative officials by providing citizen-suit provisions
in nearly all major environmental legislation." Similarly, the
judiciary has stated that "the very legitimacy of general policymaking
performed by unelected administrators depends in no small part upon
the openness, accessibility, and amenability of these officials to the
needs and ideas of the public from whom their ultimate authority
derives, and upon whom their commands must fall."' 9
At a constitutional level, two doctrines protect against unbridled
accumulations of power at the administrative level. The legislative
non-delegation doctrine, which flows directly from the concept of
separated powers, proscribes congressional delegation of certain law-
making functions to the executive branch agencies, thereby ensuring
that Congress does not abrogate its legislative duty.
Even when the delegation of power to an agency is assumed to
be legitimate, public participation represents a procedural safeguard,
ensuring that administrative power to make substantive decisions is
15. Id.; see also KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL
SYSTEM 126 (2d ed. 1988) ("[T]he popular government ideal could still remain in
salvageable condition as long as the public could exert reasonable influence and retain
sufficient control over the policy-making processes of public administrators.").
16. Hanes, supra note 1, at 731.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. See infra note 104 and accompanying text; see also Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 560 (1986) ("Congress enacted [the
citizen-suit provision of the Clean Air Act] ... 'to afford ... citizens ... very broad
opportunities to participate in the effort to prevent and abate air pollution.' ") (citation
omitted).
19. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400-01 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted).
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not abused. In this respect, public participation is a facet of procedur-
al due process, which ensures the public a meaningful opportunity to
be heard.
Constitutional theory aside, the advantages of public participation
are clearly manifest at a pragmatic level. Federal agencies have
acknowledged that public participation can build credibility for
proposals, help identify issues via diversity of opinion and expertise,
enhance public understanding, and reduce costs and delays by
resolving conflicts without resort to litigation." Together, these
factors contribute to better overall policy with less likelihood of
mistake. Arguably, these benefits are but manifestations of the
broader constitutional goal of ensuring responsive, representative
government. Nevertheless, public inclusion in administrative decision
making is rarely, if ever, motivated by agency fear of violating
constitutional doctrines.
III. THE SALVAGE TIMBER RIDER: BACKGROUND
At the outset, salvage sales must be distinguished from conven-
tional timber sales. Both are conducted by a federal agency-usually
the United States Forest Service-and both provide private timber
companies with opportunities to purchase and harvest trees. In most
other respects, however, the two types of sales differ markedly.
Conventional harvesting involves the sale of healthy, "green"
trees in accordance with statutorily required land use management
plans.2  The plans must effectuate the "sustainable yield" doctrine,
which requires that forests be rejuvenated at a relatively constant
rate,' and the "multiple use" doctrine, which requires that forest
plans accommodate many activities in addition to timber harvest,
including recreation and wildlife preservation.3
In contrast, salvage harvesting involves the sale of dead or dying
trees, although some healthy green trees are inevitably cleared, as
20. Lucinda Low Swartz, Public Participation in the NEPA Process: Scoping and
Public Involvement, in NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT [NEPA], ECOSYSTEM
ANALYSIS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACr ASSESSMENT 221,227-28 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course
of Study, 1994).
21. E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994) (requiring preparation of land and resource
management plans for units of the National Forest System).
22. E.g., id. § 1611(a) (requiring that the "sustainable-yield" concept be applied to
units of the National Forest System).
23. E.g., id. § 1607 (requiring that the "multiple use" concept be applied to units of
the National Forest System).
June 1996] CLEAR-CUTTING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
when road construction is required to allow access to the trees. 24 As
will be illustrated below, the extent to which healthy trees are cleared
under the guise of a salvage sale is very controversial, and has only
been exacerbated by the language of the Rider.
Most salvage sales are the result of unanticipated natural disasters
like fire, insect attack, or disease, and are not accounted for in the
long-term management plans which accompany conventional sales.
Although more timber is harvested through the conventional sales
process than through salvage sales, the latter are far from insignifi-
cant. In fiscal year 1994, for example, the Forest Service harvested a
total-green plus salvage-of 4.8 billion board feet (BBF).2 In fiscal
year 1995, the Service harvested over 1.7 BBF as salvage,26 the
equivalent of thirty-five percent of the previous year's total harvest.
Moreover, because natural disasters may strike anywhere, salvage
sales have the potential to impact the most pristine regions of forest,
and are not limited to lands designated for conventional harvesting
under the management plans. Within the first eight months since
enactment, the Rider has led to wide-scale cutting in many old-growth
forests, much of it in the Pacific Northwest.27
A primary objective of salvage sales is to allow harvesting of
dead or dying wood before it rots on the forest floor, thus increasing
the total supply of federal timber to the wood products industry.'
Because wood rots fairly quickly, sales that get stalled in court may
never come to fruition. This was a primary rationale for the Rider,
with Congress emphasizing that the provisions would preserve jobs by
allowing removal of timber while it still had "maximum economic
value,"29 and that the Rider would eliminate "dilatory legal challeng-
es" by environmentalists." Because the total timber available from
the Forest Service has dwindled in recent years-from a peak of
twelve BBF in 1988 to less than five BBF in 199431-the pressure to
harvest salvage trees-and thereby preserve jobs-has increased
24. Ross W. GORTE, CONG. REs. SERV., SALVAGE TIMBER SALES AND FOREST
HEALTH 2 (1995).
25. 1994 USDA, REP. OF THE FOREST SERVICE 14.
26. Informational Memorandum from Jack W. Thomas, Chief of the Forest Service,
to Greg Frazier, Chief of Staff, United States Department of Agriculture (Oct. 11, 1995)
(on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
27. Gerstenzang, supra note 9, at A16.
28. GORTE, supra note 24, at 1.
29. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 124, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 134 (1995).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 3.
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dramatically.
The environmental impacts of salvage logging are highly
contentious.' Proponents claim that the practice is necessary to thin
forests and stop the spread of disease or fire.33 Critics counter that
forests have been naturally thinning themselves for centuries, that
dead and dying trees are necessary to maintain endemic levels of
native pests and pathogens essential to sustain the ecosystem, 34 and
that the clear-cutting techniques frequently employed have serious
ramifications for water quality, soil erosion, and animal popula-
tions.
35
Critics also claim that the practice may encourage intentional
arson by those who stand to profit from the ensuing sale of damaged
trees.35  In California, an estimated seventy-two percent of the
economic damage from forest fires is attributed to arson,37 and in the
Southeast, where lightning is less frequent, the Forest Service
estimates that ninety percent of forest fires are deliberately set.38 In
one-case a man convicted of setting a string of fires in Shasta County,
California, was actually leasing his water truck to the Forest Service
to help extinguish the fires he had ignited.39
In essence, the salvage timber issue is the classic "jobs versus
environment" scenario. Immediate harvest of the timber without
adequate consideration of environmental consequences may be
disastrous. Alternatively, any delay in harvesting due to administra-
tive or legal challenges may result in timber with absolutely no
economic value and an associated loss of jobs.
With the passage of the Salvage Timber Rider, Congress added
more fuel to the timber salvage debate. Although the substance of
the Rider was highly contentious,' the House and Senate provided
minimal opportunity for debate or review, primarily because the
timber provisions were attached as a rider to a large appropriations
32. Kathie Durbin, The "timber salvage" scam, AMICUS J., Fall 1995, at 29, 30.
33. Id.
34. GORTE, supra note 24, at 3.
35. Id. The practice has been blamed for destroying salmon and trout spawning
habitat, and threatening drinking water supplies. 141 CONG. REc. H6642 (daily ed. June
29, 1995) (comments of Rep. Bill Richardson (D-N.M.)).
36. Richard Cole, Arsonists Torching U.S. Forests For Profit, ORANGE COUNTY REG.,
Sept. 4, 1995, at News 1.
37. Idi
38. Id.
39. Id. at News 2.
40. Gerstenzang, supra note 9, at A16.
June 1996] CLEAR-CUTTING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
and rescissions bill,4" a practice for which Congress has been sharply
criticized in recent years.42 As one environmental group noted,
because appropriations bills typically move quickly through commit-
tees with few hearings or opportunities for debate, changes that would
normally be addressed by committees with proper jurisdiction and
experience writing environmental laws instead get written "behind
closed doors, where the public interest is most apt to be compromised
by special interest pleading."'43
The Salvage Timber Rider, for example, was attached to a
politically popular bill providing emergency relief aid for the
Oklahoma City bombing victims, redevelopment money for the Los
Angeles earthquake recovery projects, and cost-saving rescissions to
various government programs.' Not surprisingly, most of the floor
debate centered not on the timber provisions, but on the appropria-
tions and rescissions language.4 5 The extent to which the timber
provisions were considered secondary to the other language in the Bill
is exemplified by Representative Livingston's statement on the House
floor. In response to a request for postponement of the vote due to
ongoing deliberations with the White House, Livingston noted that
the negotiations affected only the "timber issue and have nothing
whatsoever to do with the substance of th[e] bill."1
46
The debate which did transpire was generally with minimal time
to prepare. Although tentative drafts of the timber provisions had
been circulating for months, the final version was not available until
days before the vote. House Democrat DeFazio, for example,
complained that he had been provided only two days to review the
final draft prior to vote,47 while House Democrat Obey objected that
proceeding to vote was "ludicrous" because he was being "asked to
vote on th[e] agreement without even having seen it"' or having had
an opportunity "to talk to people who have actually done the
41. See Salvage Timber Rider, supra note 5.
42. See generally NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, STEALTH ATTACK:
GUTTING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION THROUGH THE BUDGET PROCESS (1995)
(criticizing congressional budget-based attacks on environmental statutes).
43. Id. at 2.
44. See Salvage Timber Rider, supra note 5.
45. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. H6621-22 (daily ed. June 29, 1995) (comments of Rep.
Bob Livingston (R-La.)).
46. Id. at H6636.
47. Id. at H6638.
48. Id. at H6637.
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negotiating."49
And unlike past reformulations of environmental policy, the
Salvage Timber Rider deliberations received little media attention,
due in part to the blitzkrieg of legislation introduced by the House
during the "first hundred days" following the November 1994 elec-
tion.5" Although President Clinton openly opposed the timber
provisions,5' he was under pressure from House Republicans to pass
the rescissions language, and signed the entire package on July 27,
1995, over the protests of most major environmental organizations
and Vice President Gore. The signing triggered a "twenty-one chain
saw salute" by protesters outside the White House the following
day.
52
IV. EFFECT ON PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Even more controversial than the lack of congressional debate
are the procedural restrictions of the Rider itself. The Rider clears
the way for expedited, large-scale salvage timber sales, to be
conducted primarily by the United States Forest Service, a subagency
of the Department of Agriculture.53 In striking contrast to past
legislation, the Salvage Timber Rider provides minimal opportunity
for public participation in the development, management, and
enforcement of salvage timber sales.
A. Ramifications of Exempting NEPA
One of the more controversial provisions of the Rider is
subsection 2001(i), which renders "[a]ll... federal environmental and
natural resource laws" inapplicable to salvage timber sales.54 In one
sentence, decades of environmental law and deliberation were
49. Id. at H6640.
50. See Joe Davis, The Scoop That Never Was, AMICUs J., Summer 1995, at 18, 19.
51. Memorandum on Timber Salvage Legislation, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1356
(Aug. 1, 1995).
52. Durbin, supra note 32, at 29.
53. Salvage Timber Rider, supra note 5, § 2001(a)(4)-(b)(1). The Rider requires that
sales be conducted by the Secretary of Agriculture or the Secretary of the Interior. Id.
The former heads the Department of Agriculture, which includes the United States Forest
Service. The Secretary of the Interior heads the Department of the Interior and
administers lands under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land Management. The vast
majority of salvage sales, however, fall under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service.
Throughout this Comment, the Department of Agriculture, Department of the Interior,
and the United States Forest Service are referred to alternatively as the "agency."
54. Id. § 2001(i).
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discarded, including the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources
Planning Act of 1974,"5 the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976,56 the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA)57, the Endangered Species Act of 1973,8 and the National
Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA)59 . Together, these Acts
represented the fruition of congressional attempts to produce a
foundation of sustainable forest management by fostering open
decision making in which the public could participate.' °
The regulations implementing the NFMA, for example, would
have provided for extensive public notice and comment for salvage
sales, including a thirty-day window for reception of written and oral
comments,6' and a requirement that the Forest Service address the
comments received.62 The Service considered this issue as recently
as 1993, when it addressed a proposal to restrict the notice and
comment period for some low volume salvaging.63 Due to substan-
tial criticism, the Service revised the proposed rule "to make [all]
emergency [salvage] actions subject to notice and comment proce-
dures," and "to assure that the public receives timely information
about such projects and preserves subsequent opportunity to appeal
such decisions."' "[Salvage] timber sales," the Service noted, are
"often controversial and of keen public interest, even where impacts
are minimal. If these decisions were exempted from notice and
comment,... agency credibility could be questioned."'65 Under the
Salvage Timber Rider, of course, the NFMA notice and comment
regulations are inapplicable.
But by far the most damaging blow to public participation is the
bypassing of NEPA. NEPA's role as the procedural backbone to
environmental policy has been universally acknowledged, and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has described NEPA's
55. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1994).
56. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
58. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
59. Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 16 U.S.C.).
60. Duane R. Gibson, Sustainable Development and the Forestry Law of the Tongass
National Forest and Indonesian Forests, 31 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 403, 425 (1995).
61. 36 C.F.R. § 215.6(a) (1995).
62. Id. § 215.6(d).
63. 58 Fed. Reg. 58,904 (1993).
64. Id. at 58,905-06.
65. Id. at 58,905.
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procedural process as "our basic national charter for protection of the
environment."'  In the context of forest management, NEPA would
have required preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) for salvage timber sales in excess of one million board feet67
when the sales "significantly affect[] the quality of the human
environment."'  The EIS process involves the collection and review
of a variety of information regarding the probable impact of the
timber sale on the physical environment. An EIS must contain an
assessment of viable alternatives,69 each evaluated for its impact on
social and economic factors such as "wildlife, timber, fish, water
quality, subsistence, visual quality, recreation, [and] tourism."7
In the context of public participation, NEPA plays two critical
roles. First, because an EIS contains a legal sufficiency requirement,
it provides the public with an opportunity to challenge either the
absence or inadequacy of the EIS in court.7 The EIS accompanying
a salvage timber sale could be challenged, for example, if it did not
consider viable alternatives to the sale.
Second, and most importantly, NEPA provides for extensive
public involvement in the preparation, scope, and review of the EIS.
NEPA's implementing regulations, for example, include explicit public
notice requirements,72 including a duty to invite the public to attend
open meetings and comment on the scope and content of an EIS.73
The agency must assess and consider both oral and written comments
received on the draft EIS during the public comment period, and
must respond to these comments in the final EIS.74 The agency must
66. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (1995).
67. Salvage sales of less than one million board feet are "categorically excluded" from
NEPA because such a low volume is considered to have no significant impact on the
environment. See id. § 1508.4.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988); see, e.g., Marble Mountain Audubon Soc'y v. Rice,
914 F.2d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring an EIS for salvage sales not contemplated in
the EIS associated with the existing forest management plan); Foundation For Global
Sustainability Inc.'s Forest Protection and Biodiversity Project v. McConnell, 829 F. Supp.
147 (W.D.N.C. 1993) (allowing the Forest Service to segment salvage areas such that each
was under one million board feet and thereby categorically excluded from EIS
requirement).
69. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.
70. Gibson, supra note 60, at 427.
71. E.g., Marble Mountain Audubon Soc'y, 914 F.2d at 182 (inadequate EIS); Sierra
Club v. Block, 614 F. Supp. 488, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (absence of EIS).
72. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(b).
73. Al § 1503.1(a)(4).
74. Id. § 1503A.
June 1996] CLEAR-CUTTING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
either incorporate the suggestion, or explain why the comment does
not warrant further response.7 5  The final EIS, the comments
received, and any underlying documents must be made available to
the public pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.76 Finally,
the results of any relevant environmental monitoring must be made
available to the public upon request."
Thus, although NEPA contains no substantive standards, its
public involvement and information disclosure requirements provide
an opportunity for the public to apply political pressure by calling
attention to poorly conceived timber sales. As a practical matter, this
type of pressure can be quite effective, 8 and was the motivation
behind state public disclosure laws such as California's Proposition
In lieu of the extensive NEPA requirements, the Salvage Timber
Rider only requires the preparation of "a document that combines an
[E]nvironmental [A]ssessment under... [NEPA] and a [B]iological
[E]valuation under.., the Endangered Species Act."8 An Environ-
mental Assessment, however, is merely a cursory document "for
determining whether to prepare an [EIS]."'81 Similarly, a Biological
Evaluation only requires consideration of the impact of salvage sales
on threatened or endangered species,' and does not require consid-
eration of any other environmental concerns. Furthermore, "[tihese
documents need consider the environmental impacts of the salvage
sales ... only to the extent which the [Forest Service], in [its] sole
discretion, deems appropriate and feasible,"'  and neither the
Environmental Assessment nor the Biological Evaluation entails any
of the public notice and comment provisions which serve as the heart
of NEPA.
75. Id.
76. Id. § 1506.6(0 (referring to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1994)).
77. Id. § 1505.3(d).
78. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 8, § 2.3(C).
79. California Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-.13 (West 1992).
80. Salvage Timber Rider, supra note 5, § 2001(c)(1).
81. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1).
82. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1) (1994).
83. Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. Glickman, 911 F. Supp. 431, 433 (D. Mont.
1995).
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B. Ramifications for Administrative and Judicial Review
1. Administrative challenges
Due to the complex, technical nature of environmental law,
courts are reluctant to interfere with agency expertise unless there is
a clear abuse of power.' As a result of this deference, the best
opportunity to participate in or challenge a proposed timber sale
typically occurs at the administrative, rather than judicial, level. The
Salvage Timber Rider, however, effectively eliminates any meaningful
public participation in the administrative process.
a. rulemaking
The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)85 describes agency rulemaking in the following terms: "An
administrative agency.., is rarely complete, and it must always learn
the ... viewpoints of those whom its regulations will affect
[Public] participation ... in the rule-making process is essential in
order to permit administrative agencies to inform themselves and to
afford safeguards to private interests."86  Accordingly, when Con-
gress enacted the APA, it acknowledged the desirability of public
participation by providing for extensive "notice and comment"
requirements for "informal rulemaking," the process by which the vast
majority of regulations are developed.' The APA specifies that
informal rulemaking, also known as "section 553 rulemaking,"
provides for (1) publication of the proposed rule,' (2) an opportuni-
ty for the public to submit comments on the proposal, 9 and (3)
preparation of the agency's explanation of why it adopted the final
rule and how it responded to major comments received during the
public comment period.' Most federal environmental legislation
84. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865-66 (1984).
85. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1994).
86. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 79TH CONGRESS,
1944-46, at 19-20 (1946) (citation omitted).
87. In rare cases, as when required by statute, agencies will engage in formal
rulemaking, which requires a trial-type hearing on the proposed rule. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554,556-
557.
88. Id § 553(b).
89. Id. § 553(c).
90. Id.
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explicitly requires the relevant agencies to develop and promulgate
regulations to implement broad statutory objectives,91 thus providing
opportunities for both the regulated industry and environmental
groups to become actively involved in rulemaking.9
The Salvage Timber Rider, however, minimizes this avenue of
participation by "not requir[ing] [the agency] to issue... rules under
section 553 [of the APA] ... to implement [this Rider] ... or carry
out the authorities provided by [the Rider]."'93 By declining to
promulgate regulations that interpret the vague terms of the Rider,
the public is forced to challenge individual sales on a case-by-case
basis, rather than challenging agency policy in one adjudication of the
rule. Given the Rider's temporary nature, of course, the de-emphasis
on establishing policy through regulation is somewhat excusable.
Unfortunately, the relaxation of rulemaking is the mildest of the
Rider's provisions impacting public participation.
b. adjudications and hearings
In contrast to administrative rulemaking, which is legislative in
nature, administrative hearings are judicial processes, typically
presided over by an administrative law judge.94 To provide parties
with adequate due process of law, administrative hearings have many
of the same formalities as conventional trials.9 Administrative
judges may issue subpoenas, rule on offers of evidence, and ultimately
make a final finding or conclusion, including the reasons or basis
therefor. 6
In the environmental context, the ability to adjudicate at the
administrative level is often crucial, for the federal judiciary is
extremely deferential to agency actions, preferring to have complex
technical questions resolved by administrative "experts" at the
administrative level. The Supreme Court has emphasized that
91. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(f) (1994) (directing "[t]he Secretary... to promulgate
such regulations as may be appropriate to enforce [the Endangered Species Act]").
92. In recent years "negotiated rulemaking" has also become an attractive way to
maximize the effectiveness of the rulemaking process via increased public participation.
Pursuant to the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1994), the
agency will appoint a negotiating committee comprised of the major private groups
interested in a prospective rulemaking action, in an attempt to resolve disputes prior to
issuance of a draft or final regulation. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 683-85.
93. Salvage Timber Rider, supra note 5, § 2001(h).
94. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1994).
95. Id. § 556(c).
96. Id.
1873
1874 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1859
"[j]udges are not experts in the field [of pollution control]," and
should give considerable weight to an agency's construction of a
statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.' This concept is
codified in the APA, which provides that all nonadjudicatory agency
actions be set aside only if the plaintiff can show they were "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."98 Furthermore, even when plaintiffs satisfy their burden of
proof, a frequent remedy is merely to remand to the agency for
development of a more extensive record. 9
The Salvage Timber Rider, however, completely transforms the
procedural structure. The Rider specifies that "[s]alvage timber sales
... and any decision of the [Forest Service] in connection with such
sales, shall not be subject to administrative review,"'" thus forcing
challenges to be initiated at the district court level. This restriction
is in direct contradiction with the existing, but now inapplicable,
regulations of the NFMA, which provided that salvage sales be
subject to administrative appeal.' °' Somewhat ironically, the
decision by Congress to preclude administrative review ignores the
concerns of the Forest Service "experts" themselves. A primary
reason the Service did not restrict notice and comment procedures for
salvage sales, when under consideration in 1993, was the concern that
"the ... Service might give the appearance of trying to shelter
[salvage] timber sales from appeal.""l
In summary, the de-emphasis on rulemaking, with its associated
notice and comment opportunities, combined with the elimination of
administrative review, eliminates any meaningful opportunity for the
public to make its voice heard at the agency level.
2. Judicial review
a. potential standing hurdles
Historically, Congress has recognized that opportunities for
citizen litigation enhance the legitimacy of administrative decision
97. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Likewise, formal adjudicatory findings will only be
overturned on judicial review if they are "unsupported by substantial evidence." Id.
§ 706(2)(E).
99. E.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
100. Salvage Timber Rider, supra note 5, § 2001(e).
101. 36 C.F.R. § 215.7(b) (1995).
102. 58 Fed. Reg. 58,905 (1993).
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making. 3 Accordingly, Congress provided for citizen-suit provi-
sions in nearly all major environmental legislation, 4 recognizing
that the resulting litigation could help abate environmental threats by
allowing a citizen group to act as an auxiliary attorney-general. 0 5
Citizen suits are generally filed by environmental groups challenging
an agency's failure to act, either in the context of failure to enforce
regulations against known violators, or mandamus-like suits alleging
failure to discharge nondiscretionary duties such as implementing
regulations by statutory deadlines."
Unlike most environmental legislation, the Salvage Timber Rider
contains no analogy to the citizen-suit provision. To some extent, the
omission is not surprising. Because the Rider expedites the removal
and sale of trees, environmental groups-the traditional beneficiaries
of citizen-suit provisions-would have little interest in challenging an
agency's failure to act.
But environmental groups may still seek to enjoin a proposed
sale of trees, alleging that the sale falls beyond the scope of authority
of the Forest Service, perhaps because the trees are not "imminently
susceptible to fire or insect attack."1" In this respect, a citizen-suit
provision would provide the additional benefit of creating broad
standing to sue.
In general, plaintiffs establish standing if: (1) the challenged
action will cause the plaintiff some actual or threatened injury-in-fact;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; (3) the injury
is redressable by judicial action; (4) the plaintiffs are claiming their
own legal rights, not those of third parties; (5) the injury is not an
abstract, generalized grievance; and (6) the injury is arguably within
103. Babich, supra note 14, at 10,141.
104. The following federal environmental laws contain citizen-suit provisions: the Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994); the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g) (1994); the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270
(1994); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); the Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1994); the Deepwater Port
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (1994); the Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1988); the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988); the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988); the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (1988); the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349 (1988); and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act,
49 U.S.C. app. § 2014 (1988).
105. Babich, supra note 14, at 10,141.
106. Id. at 10,145.
107. Salvage Timber Rider, supra note 5, § 2001(a)(3).
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the "zone-of-interest" to be protected by the statute alleged to have
been violated."° The first three conditions are constitutional,
stemming from Article III case and controversy and separation of
power considerations,"°9 and are thus mandatory."0 The latter
three requirements-including the zone-of-interest inquiry-are
prudential, and may be altered by Congress at its discretion."' This
is precisely what Congress accomplished by enacting citizen-suit
provisions. It granted standing to "any person" that satisfies the first
three constitutional requirements."2
Without such a provision, plaintiffs seeking to challenge a
proposed timber sale must rely for a cause of action upon section 702
of the APA, which provides a claim to those parties "adversely
affected or aggrieved" by "agency action within the meaning of [the]
relevant statute."".3 The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase
"within the meaning of the statute" to require that the plaintiff's
alleged injury fall within the zone-of-interest sought to be protected
by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for the
complaint." 4 Because this is identical to the prudential require-
ment, section 702 does not in any way enhance a plaintiff's ability to
establish standing."'
108. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-500 (1975).
109. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
110. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
111. Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 474-75; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 738 (197-2) ("[Statutory] broadening [of] the categories of injury that may be alleged
in support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the [constitutional]
requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.").
112. E.g.. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988) (providing that "any person" may bring an action
against violators of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
113. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
114. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990).
115. The Rider describes the allowable "[p]lace and time of filing" a complaint.
Salvage Timber Rider, supra note 5, § 2001(f)(1). It is not obvious that the language was
intended to create a new cause of action, as opposed to modifying the filing conditions for
an existing cause of action established under § 702 of the APA. For purposes of the
following discussion, however, the source of the cause of action is irrelevant because the
zone-of-interest test has universal application, although this contention has been subject
to limited debate. The Court in Valley Forge Christian College stated that any com-
plaint-whether filed under the APA or not-must fall within the zone-of-interest of the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question. 454 U.S. at 475 (citing Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)); see also Dan Caputo Co. v.
Russian River County Sanitation Dist., 749 F.2d 571, 575 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[Tlhe zone-of-
interest requirement ... for actions under the APA has been adopted as a generally
applicable prudential limitation on standing."). In Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479
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The additional requirement-that of satisfying the zone-of-
interest-may prove troublesome to pro-environmental plaintiffs. 6
Although the Supreme Court has allowed the potential for infringe-
ment of "recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment" to serve as the
basis for standing,"7 it was done when the statute in question
specifically proclaimed environmental preservation as its goal. NEPA,
for example, states that "it is the continuing responsibility of the
[flederal [g]ovemment... to use all practical means.., to assure for
all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and
culturally pleasing surroundings... 8 Thus, a plaintiff challenging an
agency's action under NEPA needs only to show a particularized
injury..9 to their "aesthetic or cultural use of the biophysical envi-
ronment in order to establish standing.""12
In contrast, potential plaintiffs have been denied standing under
the zone-of-interest test when no indication was found of a congres-
sional purpose to benefit the plaintiffs, and when the plaintiffs'
alleged interest at stake was inconsistent with the intended effect of
the underlying statute.
12'
U.S. 388 (1987), the Court stated in a footnote that although general inquiries into
prudential standing in the non-APA context may "resemble" the zone-of-interest test, the
test was not necessarily a requirement of universal application. Id. at 400 n.16.
Nevertheless, courts after Clarke have continued to characterize the zone-of-interest test
as one of general applicability. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861
F.2d 277, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
116. The problems with satisfying the zone-of-interest requirement would appear to
affect only pro-environmental plaintiffs. The legislative history indicates that one goal of
the Rider was to provide harvesting opportunities for the timber industry, and the Rider
itself explicitly states that the Secretary must conduct salvage sales "to the maximum
extent feasible." Salvage Timber Rider, supra note 5, § 2001(b)(2). Therefore, a timber
company that sued to compel a salvage sale would presumably satisfy the zone-of-interest
requirement. Cf Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d
800, 808 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that timber companies lacked standing to compel Forest
Service to sell trees where the governing language limited the Service to selling trees
.. 'equal to or less than' "the amount required to produce a sustainable yield in the forest
(quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (1994))).
117. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 872.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).
119. To satisfy the constitutional standing requirement of particularized injury, "a
plaintiff claiming injury from environmental damage must use the area affected by the
challenged activity, and not an area roughly 'in the vicinity' of it." Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1992) (quoting National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 887).
120. Dinah Bear, The National Environmental Policy Act: Its Origins and Evolutions,
10 NAT'L RESOURCES & ENV'T 3,70 (1995).
121. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 861 F.2d at 283 (holding that
recycling and disposal firms' economic interest in retaining hazardous waste regulations not
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The Salvage Timber Rider, however, has no explicit preserva-
tionist preamble, and was not enacted to protect recreational use or
aesthetic enjoyment. The nearest equivalent to a statement of
purpose appears in section 2001(b)(1), which mandates the Forest
Service "to achieve, to the maximum extent feasible, a salvage timber
sale volume level above the [existing] programmed level to reduce the
backlogged volume of salvage timber."'" And the legislative his-
tory indicates two goals of the Rider: (1) to provide logging oppor-
tunities in the timber industry," and (2) to mitigate forest health
hazards. 24 Although these are arguably valid rationales, they are
hardly the aesthetic or recreational interests to which environmental
groups could attach standing."z
b. limitations on trial preparation
Even if the zone-of-interest requirement was satisfied, section 702
of the APA only permits suits based on "final" agency action.
Because mere studies or recommendations do not constitute final
action, 26 the earliest time to file suit would likely be the formal
agency announcement of a proposed sale. But the Rider specifies
that suits must be filed no later than fifteen days after such an
announcement2  and explicitly prohibits courts from granting
extensions." Plaintiffs, therefore, are left with only two weeks to
assess the environmental impacts of a proposed sale and prepare a
complaint.
For example, the Forest Service decision to sell over 250 acres in
the Tuskegee National Forest was published in local newspapers in
sufficiently related to congressional intent to encourage recycling and disposal of waste
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
122. Salvage Timber Rider, supra note 5, § 2001(b)(1); Kentucky Heartwood, Inc. v.
United States Forest Serv., 906 F. Supp. 410, 412-13 (E.D. Ky. 1995) (stating that "the
general purpose of the rider may at least in part be to reduce a backlog of salvage
timber").
123. 141 CONG. REC. S10,463 (daily ed. July 21, 1995) (comments of Sen. Gorton (R-
Wash.)).
124. Id. at H6638 (daily ed. June 29, 1995) (comments of Re. DeFazio (D-Or.)).
125. The standing issue, however, was not raised by the defendants in the early suits
challenging sales offered pursuant to the Rider. See Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council
v. Glickman, 911 F. Supp. 431 (D. Mont. 1995); Idaho Conservation League v. Thomas,
No. CV 95-0425-S-FJL, 1995 WL 789239 (D. Idaho Dec. 11, 1995); Kentucky Heartwood,
Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., 906 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
126. Save the Dunes Council v. Alexander, 584 F.2d 158, 164 (7th Cir. 1978).
127. Salvage Timber Rider, supra note 5, § 2001(f)(1).
128. 1d.
June 1996] CLEAR-CUTTING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Montgomery, Alabama on January 3, 1996.129 In plaintiffs' com-
plaint challenging the sale, they sharply criticized this provision as
being an unreasonable limitation under which they were "not able to
get all necessary expert witnesses, documents and other materials pre-
pared. 13 °
c. standard of review
i. applying the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
Assuming that plaintiffs have successfully established standing
and filed a complaint within the fifteen-day window, the Rider
prohibits the Forest Service from taking further action to award the
sale for forty-five days, 13 after which time a court must render a
decision. 32 For plaintiffs to prevail, the court will need to deter-
mine, upon "review of the record," that "the decision to ... offer...
such sale was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance
with applicable law."133 For several reasons, plaintiffs may find this
an insurmountable burden.
First, the phrase "not in accordance with applicable law" is
largely superfluous, for the Rider itself explicitly makes "[a]ll ...
applicable federal environmental and natural resource laws" inapplica-
ble to salvage timber sales." 4 The only significant "applicable law,"
therefore, appears to be the Rider itself.
Second, the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, which the Rider
incorporated from the Administrative Procedure Act,'13 is extremely
deferential. Under this standard, reviewing courts will uphold an
agency decision if it was "based on a consideration of the relevant
factors" and was not a "clear error of judgment.' ' 136 If the action
was reasonable, the court will not "substitute its judgment for that of
the agency."'137
The Rider, however, uses extremely vague terms, providing
129. Complaint at 5, Alabama Wilderness Alliance v. Carter, Civil Action No. 96-T-101-
E (M.D. Ala. filed Jan. 18, 1996) [hereinafter Complaint].
130. Id. at 12.
131. Salvage Timber Rider, supra note 5, § 2001(f)(2).
132. l1& § 2001(f)(5).
133. Id. § 2001(0(4).
134. Id. § 2001(i).
135. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
136. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
137. Id.
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enormous discretion to the Forest Service to decide which trees to sell
and making it nearly impossible to show that the decision was
arbitrary and capricious. Section 2001(a)(3), for example, allows the
sale of trees "associated" with dead or damaged trees, as long as the
entire sale includes an "identifiable salvage component" of dead or
damaged trees. 8 The Rider does not illuminate on the terms
"associated" or "identifiable component," thus implicitly providing the
Service with the authority to interpret them.
Comparing the language in the Rider with the existing-but now
inapplicable-terms of the National Forest Management Act of 1976
(NFMA) 1.9 is illuminating. The NFMA allowed the Forest Service
to sell trees "which are substantially damaged by fire, windthrow, or
other catastrophe, or which are in imminent danger from insect or
disease attack."'" Noticeably absent is any reference to "associat-
ed" trees or "identifiable... components," and the legislative history
of the Rider fails to indicate why these additional and extremely
broad terms were necessary. The problem of the vague terms was
raised on the House floor by Representative McDermott, who
complained that "[w]hile proponents of [the] bill claim that loggers
only will cut down trees that are diseased, the actual ... language
states that loggers may go in and cut whatever they see fit as long as
there are any trees in the forest that are damaged."''
The difficulty of proving arbitrary and capricious conduct is
exemplified by Idaho Conservation League v. Thomas,"' in which
environmental groups sought to enjoin the Forest Service from
conducting salvage. sales near the Salmon River in Idaho's Boise and
Payette National Forests.'4 3 Because the salvage sale was initiated
prior to passage of the Rider, the Service had begun to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement.' 44 While preparing the document,
the Service consulted with the EPA, the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS), and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
(USFWS).'45 In the unanimous opinion of these agencies, the
138. Salvage Timber Rider, supra note 5, § 2001(a)(3).
139. Pub. L. No. 94-588,90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 16 U.S.C.).
140. 16 U.S.C. § 1611(b) (1994).
141. 141 CONG. REC. H6642 (daily ed. June 29, 1995).
142. No. CV 95-0425-S-EJL, 1995 WL 789239 (D. Idaho Dec. 11, 1995).
143. Id. at *1.
144. Id. at *2.
145. Id. at *2-*3.
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environmental risks posed by the salvage sale were too great to
render it acceptable. 6  The EPA concluded that the sale would
"further aggravate the already critically degraded habitat for
threatened salmon,"'47 and the USFWS opined that the sale would
have general "adverse impacts to fish and wildlife."'" The Forest
Service, not content with the agency opinions, convened its own
internal panel of experts to determine if there was a "better scientific
basis for the decision."'49  Not surprisingly, the Forest Service
experts recommended that the sale go forward.50
Plaintiffs brought suit, contending that the sale was arbitrary and
capricious because it ignored the expert advice of the other federal
agencies."5 The district court disagreed. Noting that the Rider
"grants the [Service] sole discretion over the information considered
and relied on to reach [its] decision," 52 the court held that the
"substantial interagency" criticism of the sale rendered it neither
arbitrary nor capricious. 3
Idaho Conservation League sets an ominous precedent for future
challenges to salvage sales. If the unanimous objections of the EPA,
NMFS, and USFWS are insufficient to render a sale capricious, it is
difficult to imagine a scenario in which such a finding would be made.
To date, not a single challenge under the Rider has succeeded in
showing that the decision to conduct a salvage sale was either
arbitrary or capricious."
ii. restricting the reviewable record
The requirement that judicial review be based exclusively on a
"review of the record"'55 makes the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard all the more insurmountable. The requirement mandates
that reviewing courts assess the capriciousness of decisions based only
146. Id. at *3.
147. Id.
148. 1l
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at *5.
152. Id.
153. Id. at *5-*6.
154. See Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. Glickman, 911 F. Supp. 431 (D. Mont.
1995); Idaho Conservation League v. Thomas, No. CV 95-0425-S-EJL, 1995 WL 789239
(D. Idaho Dec. 11, 1995); Kentucky Heartwood, Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., 906 F.
Supp. 410 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
155. Salvage Timber Rider, supra note 5, § 2001(0(4).
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on the information before the Forest Service at the time the decision
was made. 56 Although the standard is well established in adminis-
trative law,157 its incorporation by the Rider is inappropriate. In the
past, environmental laws mandated that certain information be
included in the administrative record. Under NEPA, for example, the
Forest Service would have been required to prepare an Environmen-
tal Impact Statement, which could serve as a detailed record of the
basis for the timber sale. 5 Plaintiffs, therefore, could challenge
Forest Service decisions as arbitrary and capricious in light of the
information contained in the EIS. Public comments regarding the
EIS, and~responses thereto, would likewise become incorporated in
the administrative record.
The Salvage Timber Rider, however, explicitly renders NEPA
inapplicable,15 9 thus eliminating the mandatory preparation of an
EIS. Although the Rider mentions preparation of an Environmental
Assessment-a cursory document intended, under NEPA, as a
precursor to the more exhaustive EIS-the preparation is discretion-
ary, with the "scope and content of the documentation and informa-
tion prepared, considered, and relied on ... [to be] at the sole
discretion of the [Forest Service]. 160 This arrangement creates the
type of "fox guarding the hen-house" scenario criticized by adminis-
trative law experts as' nondemocratic: 61 The Chief of the Forest
Service, an unelected official who heads the agency that is the
economic beneficiary of the timber sale, has the sole discretion to
determine what information should be included in the administrative
record. This record, in turn, is the exclusive basis for judicial review
of the Forest Service decision.
In Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. Glickman,62 for
example, the Forest Service moved to strike all extra-record docu-
ments offered by the plaintiffs that were not part of the original
administrative record, despite the plaintiffs contention that the
documents explained technical issues and provided information
156. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 420.
157. See id.
158. See supra part IV.A.
159. Salvage Timber Rider, supra note 5, § 2001(i)(3).
160. Id. § 2001(c)(1)(C).
161. See WARREN, supra note 15, at 124 ("[O]bservers have discovered that public
administrators can jeopardize rule of law precepts by informally promulgating rules and
orders in the absence of a clear, written, and reviewable record.").
162. 911 F. Supp. 431 (D. Mont. 1995).
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contrary to that contained in the record.16 The court accepted the
Forest Service contention that "[p]laintiffs submissions [were]
inappropriate because review... [was] limited to the administrative
record,"'" and ordered the documents to be stricken.65 With this
contrary evidence cast aside, the court proceeded to hold that the sale
was neither arbitrary nor capricious.'66
The restrictions on extra-record introduction of evidence might
explain why the Forest Service has not challenged standing in any of
the cases brought under the Rider.67 Such a challenge might allow
discovery and new evidence not included in the original administrative
record, thus potentially biasing the merits of any contention by the
Service that decisions were not arbitrary and capricious.
d. appellate review
If a plaintiff loses in district court, the Rider provides for
appellate review if filed within thirty days of the district court
decision."6 There is no extension, however, of the forty-five day
moratorium on execution of the timber contract, and the Rider
explicitly prohibits the district court from ordering temporary
restraining orders or preliminary injunctions pending appeal. 69
Thus, a plaintiff could win on appeal yet be too late to save the forest.
The Oregon Natural Resources Council (ONRC) and the Sierra
Club faced precisely this dilemma while attempting to prevent the
Forest Service from selling stands in Warner Creek, Oregon.170 The
district court had enjoined the sale of the timber until the Forest
Service could incorporate findings regarding arson into the EIS
required by NEPA.171 With the passage of the Rider, however,
NEPA became inapplicable, and the injunction was dissolved.172
Both the ONRC and the Sierra Club planned to appeal the ruling, but
163. Id. at 437.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.; see also Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas, No. 95-6272-HO, slip
op. at 8-9 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 1995) (noting that defendants' Motion to Strike Extra-record
Documents was moot due to plaintiffs' failure to state a valid claim under the Rider).
167. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
168. Salvage Timber Rider, supra note 5, § 2001(f)(7).
169. Id. § 2001(f)(3).
170. Dana Tims, Judge Clears Salvage Logging, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Sept. 7,1995,
at B1.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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the prohibition on temporary injunctions pending appeal meant that
the logging company could begin removing the trees immediately.'
SV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The previous section attempted to identify the immediate,
practical impacts of the Rider on public participation. As discussed
in Part II, such participation ensures that the agencies are responsive
to the people, and serves as a check on the accumulation of quasi-
legislative power by the executive branch. But the necessity of public
participation becomes attenuated, at least in the separation of powers
context, when constitutional doctrines independently ensure that
executive agencies do not accumulate excessive power. The following
section, therefore, addresses two constitutional'doctrines-legislative
non-delegation and procedural due process-both of which effectuate
restraints on unbridled administrative power.
A. Legislative Non-Delegation
Article I, Section I of the Constitution provides that "[a]ll
legislative Powers ... shall be vested in a Congress.""7 4  The
Supreme Court, however, has not seriously entertained a legislative
non-delegation doctrine since the New Deal era,' 75 acknowledging
that Congress can not legislate with precision in all areas of public
interest. 7 6  In 1980, however, Justice-now Chief Jus-
tice-Rehnquist suggested a resuscitation of the non-delegation
principle in his concurrence in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO
v. American Petroleum Institute.'77  In American Petroleum,
Rehnquist articulated what he felt were the purposes of the non-
delegation doctrine. First, the doctrine forces Congress, the elected
representatives of the people, to make the important policy choices,
thus maintaining ultimate power with the people.7 8 Second, the
doctrine guarantees that any delegations to an agency will be
accompanied by an "intelligible principle" to guide both the exercise
173. Id.
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
175. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator
Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932).
176. WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 28 (2d ed. 1992).
177. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
178. Id. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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of the delegated discretion and the judicial review thereof_17 9
allowing courts "to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been
obeyed.
180
Within a year of American Petroleum, Rehnquist, joined by
former Chief Justice Burger, applied the non-delegation doctrine in
his dissenting opinion in American Textile Manufacturers Institute v.
Donovan,181 in which the Court was asked to determine whether the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 19701 required the Secre-
tary of Labor to perform a cost-benefit analysis prior to promulgating
a cotton dust standard.Y To render a holding, the Court was
forced to interpret vague statutory language which stated that cotton
dust standards must be set "to the extent feasible," but with no
elaboration on whether "feasibility" referred to technological or
economical considerations." Rehnquist emphasized that there had
been a fundamental policy disagreement on the issue in Congress, and
rather than either mandating or prohibiting cost-benefit analyses,
Congress simply abrogated its policymaking duties to the agency
through the intentional use of vague and ambiguous language.185
Rehnquist felt that had Congress been forced to decide the issue,
there may not have been any bill for the President to sign. 86
Furthermore, he believed this policy decision had ultimately been
thrust on the Court, which had no guidance in ascertaining the will of
Congress." In Rehnquist's view, such an abrogation contrasted to
a legitimate delegation in which Congress concluded that an agency
was factually better positioned to establish policy, or when the policy
issue was relatively minor.
Accepting Rehnquist's reasoning, the Salvage Timber Rider may
be unconstitutional. The magnitude of logging in the nation's forests
is a major policy issue which, at least arguably, dwarfs the cotton dust
standard issue of Donovan. The subject is highly contentious,
especially in areas with old-growth stands or in regions inhabited by
179. Id. at 685-86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
180. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944).
181. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
182. Pub. L. No. 91-596,84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-
678 (1994)).
183. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 494.
184. Id. at 544 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 545-47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 546-47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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threatened or endangered species. Yet, the Rider requires the Forest
Service to conduct salvage timber sales "to the maximum extent
feasible,"'" and defines "salvage timber sale" to include any sale
which includes "an identifiable salvage component" of dead or dying
trees."9 This language appears to permit the Service to initiate a
sale that consists almost entirely of healthy, old-growth trees, as long
as there is an associated "component" of dead or damaged trees. As
in Donovan, neither the Rider nor its legislative history elaborate on
the vague terms "feasible" or "identifiable," providing courts with no
guidance to interpret them. Additionally, and also analogous to
Donovan, no bill would have made it to the President's desk but for
a strong desire by Congress to enact attached legislation, in this case
the relief aid and rescissions language. The timber provisions alone
were not likely to reach President Clinton, who openly opposed
them," and House Republicans probably lacked the votes to
override a veto.
Other proponents of a rejuvenated non-delegation doctrine have
suggested that it be transformed to de-emphasize the requirement of
specific and meaningful statutory standards while emphasizing the
need for procedural safeguards to protect against unnecessary and
uncontrolled discretionary power. 9' Under this theory, the validity
of congressional delegations should turn upon the totality of the
protections against arbitrariness, not merely the specificity of the
substantive standards."g The theory suggests that the potential for
abuse due to the vague standards in the Salvage Timber Rider could
be offset by providing for stricter procedural checks on the agency.
As previously illustrated, however, the Rider accomplishes just the
opposite, curtailing nearly all conventional procedural safeguards,
from notice and comment to administrative and judicial review.
B. Procedural Due Process
The most fundamental tenet of due process is "the opportunity
188. Salvage Timber Rider, supra note 5, § 2001(b)(1).
189. Id. § 2001(a)(3).
190. See Gerstenzang, supra note 9, at A16.
191. Kenneth C. Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 725
(1969).
192. Id. at 726; see Iske v. United States, 396 F.2d 28, 31 (10th Cir. 1968) (stating that
the "validity of delegation [might better] be tested ... on the basis of safeguards rather
than standards").
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to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' ,193
Referring to the provision of the Rider barring temporary restraining
orders pending appeal, one plaintiff quipped that "[b]eing heard after
the timber... is cut is not at a meaningful time."'
94
The Rider undeniably institutes sweeping restrictions on
procedural opportunities for citizens to "make their voice heard."
The Supreme Court, however, has consistently held that procedural
due process is violated only when a constitutionally protected
"liberty" or "property" interest is at stake.1 95 In the "property'
context, plaintiffs must show a legal claim of entitlement to the
property, not merely an "abstract need or desire for it," no matter
how grievous the loss.'96 In other words, the "property" interest
must be affirmatively created by law, typically a government created
entitlement like welfare."9
In one constitutional attack on the Rider, an environmental
group attempted to overcome the "legal entitlement" hurdle by citing
to environmental legislation containing policy goals for national
forests,198 claiming it created a legal entitlement to the use and
enjoyment of the forest regions at issue. For example, plaintiffs cited
the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of
1974, 9 which legally requires that national forests facilitate, among
other things, outdoor recreation, watershed, wildlife, and wilder-
ness.2"° Even "the inherent right of every citizen ... to engage in
fishing" '' was cited to support the plaintiffs' penumbral "entitle-
ment."2'
The argument is not entirely persuasive. In addition to protect-
ing recreational and aesthetic qualities of national forests, federal law
also provides for timber sales and harvesting. 3 Plaintiffs did not
justify why their "entitlement" to recreational use should trump the
193. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
194. Complaint, supra note 129, at 9.
195. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
196. Id. at 577.
197. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
198. Complaint, supra note 129, at 7-9.
199. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1994).
200. Id. § 1604(e)(1).
201. Id. § 742a.
202.: Complaint, supra note 129, at 7-9.
203. E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 528 (stating that "national forests ... shall be administered for
... timber•... purposes").
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timber industry's "entitlement" to harvest. Furthermore, courts have
consistently rejected the idea of a constitutionally protected environ-
mente °4 and have limited procedural due process to more conven-
tional legal entitlements.
Nevertheless, it is informative to consider the broader implica-
tions of the Court's procedural due process doctrine to salvage timber
sales. The current "entitlements" approach has been largely derided
as a failure,0 5 most notably for attaching only to property interests
which are affirmatively defined by law, to the exclusion of all other
interests. 2 6  Because legislatures pass the laws which create the
property interest, they may simply avoid the constitutional require-
ment of fair hearings by defining away the triggering interest.2 7
Furthermore, the determination that a property interest is a legal
entitlement has little or no relation to its actual importance to the
individual.2' The doctrine may attach in a case involving the
temporary loss of a driver's license,2" but does not attach to the
potential loss of old-growth trees-arguably our most cherished public
resource. The result is incongruous at best.
The reform of procedural due process has been the subject of
extensive debate, and is beyond the scope of this Comment. As an
example, however, one critic has suggested reshaping due process in
light of NEPA."' Although both doctrines represent procedural
remedies, their approaches contrast considerably. Due process is only
triggered by the existence of underlying substantive law creating a
legal right. The magnitude of the harm involved is irrelevant. In
contrast, NEPA's procedural requirements-most notably the
preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement-are only
triggered for the most important harms, those "significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment, 21 and are triggered regard-
less of the existence or satisfaction of substantive environmental laws.
Although a radical reshaping of procedural due process is unlikely in
the near future, it is worth noting that it could serve as a constitution-
204. See Michael Herz, Parallel Universes: NEPA Lessons For The New Property, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1668, 1685 & n.84 (1993).
205. Id. at 1668.
206. Id. at 1694.
207. Id.
208. ld. at 1696.
209. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
210. See Herz, supra note 204, at 1670.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).
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al bar to the Rider's procedural restrictions.
At the constitutional level, therefore, the Rider falls into a void.
The interests at stake-loss of trees in national forests-are not
sufficient to trigger the highly derided "entitlement" approach to
procedural due process. The moribund non-delegation doc-
trine, assuming no adoption of the Rehnquist opinions of the early
1980s, provides no relief in the separation of powers realm.212
Hypothetically, therefore, the Forest Service could become the
"Forest Czar" and initiate massive clear-cutting of all remaining old-
growth forests. Although political considerations would certainly
preclude such a catastrophe, no constitutional barriers exist. In this
respect, the Rider exemplifies the Constitution's failure to protect
against ever-increasing accumulations of agency power, a trend which
threatens the very structure of our democratic government.
VI. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Congressional Agendas
A cynic might suggest that the Salvage Timber Rider is merely
a reflection of the House Republicans' broader environmental
platform, which, according to Vice President Gore, is "an extreme
anti-environmental agenda" intended to "freeze all health and
environmental protection." ' This Comment was not intended as
a generalized critique of the environmental policies of either political
party. But in the context of legislation affecting public participation,
it is interesting to contrast the Salvage Timber Rider with House Bill
9 (H.R. 9),214 the Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Bill, passed
by the House less than four months prior to the passage of the
Salvage Timber Rider. Like the Rider, H.R. 9 received the over-
whelming support of House Republicans.215 In contrast, however,
H.R. 9 proposed expanded, rather than contracted, opportunities for
public comment and participation in the regulatory process. Section
212. See supra part V.A.
213. Al Gore, Jr., Earth Days Have Become Earth Years, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995,
at A17.
214. Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995, H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
[hereinafter H.R. 9].
215. The Salvage Timber Rider passed the House on June 29, 1995 by a vote of 276 to
151. 141 CONG. REc. H6644 (daily ed. June 29, 1995). H.R. 9 passed the House on
March 3, 1995, by a vote of 277 to 141. Id. at H2638-39 (daily ed. March 3, 1995). Both
votes were primarily along party lines.
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7003(a)(2), for example, proposed to amend the Administrative
Procedure Act216 by requiring public hearings on a proposed regula-
tion if 100 persons, acting individually, submitted comments.217 The
Bill also facilitated extensions of the public comment period,218
provided for a citizen-suit provision that allows "[a]ny person injured
or threatened by a prohibited regulatory practice" to commence a
civil suit and seek an injunction,21 9 and required an extensive cost-
benefit analysis for "major" rules affecting more than 100 persons. 2 '
Several federal agencies have concluded that the regulatory
changes proposed by H.R. 9 would greatly delay, if not entirely
preclude, ongoing agency efforts to promulgate and enforce environ-
mental regulations.' The overwhelming majority of environmental
regulations are, of course, intended to mitigate pollution or protect
natural resources. Thus, both the expansions on participation in H.R.
9 and the restrictions in the Salvage Timber Rider favor business over
environmental interests. The allegation from environmental groups
is that House Republicans are hesitant to directly attack the substance
of politically popular environmental laws, yet are undermining these
laws indirectly by slashing agency budgets,' imposing intensive
cost-benefit requirements for new regulations, and-relevant to this
Comment-selectively expanding or contracting opportunities for
public participation and review.
In this respect, consider the following comment by Republican
Senator Gorton in support of the Salvage Timber Rider:
For 6 long years, rural timber communities in [the state of
Washington] have been under siege from their Federal
Government, and the implementation of environmental laws
216. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1994).
217. H.R. 9, supra note 214, § 7003(a)(2).
218. Id. § 7003(b).
219. Id. § 8207(a). The Bill limits the scope of the citizen-suit provision, however, by
defining "prohibited regulatory practice" to include only agency action motivated by
disclosures by those which the action will affect. Id. § 8204.
220. Id. § 7004.
221. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, BREACH OF FAITH: How THE
CONTRACT'S FINE PRINT UNDERMINES AMERICA'S ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS 6 (1995).
But see Victor B. Flatt, Environmental "Contraction" for America?, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
585, 613 (1996) (suggesting that the impact of the procedural reforms of H.R. 9, including
the cost-benefit requirement, might be mitigated by the agencies themselves).
222. See generally NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, STEALTH ATTACK:
GUTTING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION THROUGH THE BUDGET PROCESS (1995)
(criticizing congressional budget-based attacks on environmental statutes).
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that have neglected to consider the impacts of these laws on
people. Federal agencies have gone literally unchecked in
their imposition of regulations, and restrictions on people
and their property, and, the cumulative effects of these
actions have resulted in the destruction of rural communities
and their way of life.'
Although berating "unchecked" federal agencies, this statement was
voiced in support of the Salvage Timber Rider, which eliminates many
of the conventional checks on agency action, including administrative
and judicial review. The implicit message is that agency action must
be curtailed, unless that action serves timber industry interests, in
which case it should be expanded. Similarly, consider Senator
Gorton's assertion that agencies have "neglected to consider the
impacts ... on people," 4 made in support of a salvage timber
program which eliminates NEPA's mandate to consider the effect of
agency action on the "quality of the human environment."'  Again,
the implicit message is that agency consideration of salvage logging
impacts should be curtailed, unless the impacts adversely affect timber
industry interests, in which case they have not been considered
enough.
B. Mitigation Efforts By the Executive Branch
The Salvage Timber Rider represents a tremendous delegation
of power to the executive agencies, albeit for a limited time.
Hopefully, the Forest Service will use its discretion responsibly, and
early indications are mixed. Within a week after signing the bill
containing the Rider, President Clinton drafted a letter directing the
Service to implement the salvage provisions using any "current
environmental laws" not expressly prohibited by the Rider, even if the
Rider stated that the laws were not applicable. 6 In response, an
interagency Memorandum of Agreement was circulated indicating that
the Forest Service would continue to comply with certain environmen-
tal laws, despite not being legally compelled to do so.rn For
223. 141 CONG. REC. S10,463 (daily ed. July 21, 1995).
224. Id.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).
226. Memorandum on Timber Salvage Legislation, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1356, 1356-57 (Aug. 1, 1995).
227. Memorandum of Agreement on Timber Salvage Related Activities Under Public
Law 104-19, between United States Department of Agriculture, United States Department
of the Interior, United States Department of Commerce, United States Environmental
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example, the Memorandum stated that if the Forest Service deter-
mines that a particular salvage sale, "in [its] discretion, ordinarily
should require an EIS under ... NEPA," then the documentation
should "include analysis consistent with" those required in an EIS,
even though the documentation is not legally required to include an
EIS." s Furthermore, the Service recognized "the importance of
public involvement given the prohibition to administrative appeals,"
and committed to "involv[ing] the public" in the salvage timber
process. 29
Although these mitigating efforts by President Clinton and the
Forest Service deserve credit, they only marginally affect the impact
of the Rider because they are purely voluntary declarations, and
provide no legal mechanisms for enforcement. The preparation of the
EIS, for example, cannot be challenged in court because it is no
longer legally required under NEPA. Given the extensive case law
involving the failure of the Service to adequately prepare the EIS
when it was legally required,"0 it is naive to assume that the Service
will adequately prepare them when they are voluntary. For example,
one challenge to sales under the Rider, involving over 250 acres in
Alabama's Tuskegee National Forest, alleged that the Service failed
to prepare the cursory Environmental Assessment legally required by
the Rider-much less the voluntary EIS."
And the failure of the Forest Service to police its internal
conduct is not limited to the preparation of an EIS. Critics of the
Service, including some insiders, contend that the Service is too
closely aligned with large and politically influential timber compa-
nies. 2  Less than eight months after passage of the Rider, for
example, the Service was accused of obstructing investigations into
illegally harvested timber from national forests in Oregon and
Washington. 3  The allegations, many of which were voiced by
former Service personnel, included an accusation that the Service was
complicit in the illegal harvesting of up to 32,000 healthy green trees
Protection Agency (Aug. 9, 1995) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., supra note 71.
231. Complaint, supra note 129, at 5.
232. Alan C. Miller, Forest Service Hindered Theft Case, Groups Say, L.A. TIMEs, Mar.
25, 1996, at Al.
233. Id.
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per month under the guise of salvage sales.'
Furthermore, even assuming the best of intentions by the Service,
voluntary measures to mitigate the impacts of the Rider simply cannot
overcome the mandatory restrictions on administrative and judicial
review. 53'
Finally, if Congress senses that the President is intentionally
undermining the spirit of the Rider by compelling the agencies to
voluntarily comply with existing laws that Congress has rendered
"inapplicable," it may simply lead to additional legislation that
clarifies congressional intent. Such legislation may not be far off
The very legislators and committees which drafted and reviewed the
Rider made clear that they intend to "change the laws that have
brought us to this point," 6 that the Rider is merely "a good
starting point," 7 and that "long-term timber salvage legislation is
forthcoming." 8 To the extent the Rider will serve as a precedent,
its implications should be more thoroughly considered.
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress is the steward of our national forests, and must define
the substantive line between economic and environmental interests.
In the context of salvage timber sales, this is an extraordinarily
difficult task. The goal of this Comment, however, is not to second-
guess where the line should be drawn, but rather to criticize the nature
of the line itself Specifically, this Comment suggests that Congress
has effectuated a desired substantive change-increased salvage
logging-through two inappropriate mechanisms: (1) vague and
discretionary language; and (2) procedural restrictions on the public's
ability to implement and enforce this vague language.
Through these mechanisms, Congress has effectively delegated a
major policy issue to unelected agency officials. By so doing,
Congress has undermined a fundamental tenet of democratic
government-that power rests with the people-and has done so
concerning the administration of a publicly owned resource about
which emotions run strong-the very context most in need of direct,
234. Id. at A10.
235. See supra part IV.B.
236. 141 CONG. REC. S10,463 (daily ed. July 21, 1995) (comments of Sen. Gorton (R-
Wash.)).
237. Id. (comments of Sen. Gorton (R-Wash.)).
238. I. at H6638 (daily ed. June 29, 1995) (comments of Rep. Taylor (R-N.C.)).
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public involvement.
The practical reasons for encouraging public participation 9 are
as valid today as they were two decades ago. The existing environ-
mental framework both recognizes and encourages public interaction.
Although environmental law is necessarily a dynamic body, significant
procedural modifications should, in contrast to the Salvage Timber
Rider, be thoroughly debated by Congress, and should strive to
minimize impacts on public participation. The importance of
congressional restraint is only magnified by the Constitution's failure
to ensure that the fundamental structure of separated powers will
remain intact. By preserving public participation, the effectiveness of
environmental law improves, while the democratic ideal of govern-
ment by and for the people remains.
Paul Maynard Kakuske
239. See supra part II.
